ales by the wholesaler to the retailer and by the importer to the wholesaler were sales by sample. As the defect was not apparent on reasonable examination of the sample, both were in breach of s 15(2)(c) SGA.
A person who finds goods has what is known as a ‘possessory title’
who fails to disclose to the buyer that they only have a possessory title to the goods will be in breach of s 12 SGA
s 12(3) and s 12(5) SGA,
ircumstances that there is an intention that the seller should transfer only such title as they (or a third person) may have
s 12(1) SGA (being a condition) will entitle the innocent party to treat the contract as at an end.
s 11(4) that, in the case of a contract of sale of goods, a buyer cannot generally terminate the contract for breach of condition once they have accepted the goods (
Niblett Ltd v Confectioners’ Materials Co Ltd  3 KB 387
12(2)(a) and 12(2)(b):
Microbeads AG v Vinhurst Road Markings Ltd
s 13(1) SGA
Parties will often seek to exclude this implied term and the attendant right to terminate and reject goods if they do not comply with the contract description.
There is unlikely to be much difficulty in applying this phrase in the case of a sale of unascertained or future goods because there can be no contract for the sale of goods of these categories except by reference to a description of some sort
Beale v Taylor (1991)
Court of Appeal held that there could be a sale by description of a specific chattel, even where the chattel was displayed and inspected by the buyer, so long as it was sold not merely as the specific thing but as a thing corresponding to a description so that the buyer relied at least in part on a description.
Brewer v Mann (2012)
e Court of Appeal held that the description of the car in the hire purchase contract did not require it to be an original 1930 Bentley Speed Six.
ourt will only hold that a contract is one for the sale of goods by description if it is able to impute to the parties a common intention that it shall be a term of the contract that the goods will correspond with the description
s 13, it must be a ‘substantial ingredient of the identity of the thing sold
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen (1976),